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ABSTRACT 51 
Two disparate views of the sexual division of labour have dominated the 52 
representation of intra-household resource allocations. These joint and separate interests 53 
views differ in their interpretation of the relative roles of men and women, and make different 54 
predictions about the extent to which marriage promotes economic efficiency (i.e. maximized 55 
household production). Using an experimental “distribution task” stipulating a trade-off 56 
between household efficiency and spousal equality in allocating surpluses of meat and 57 
money, we examine factors influencing spousal distribution preferences among Tsimane 58 
forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia (n=53 couples). Our primary goal is to understand whether 59 
and how access to perfectly fungible and liquid resources – which increases with greater 60 
participation in market economies – shifts intra-household distribution preferences. We 61 
hypothesize that greater fungibility of money compared to meat results in greater squandering 62 
of money for individual fitness gain at a cost to the family. Money therefore requires costly 63 
strategies to insure against a partner’s claims for consumption. Whereas nearly all Tsimane 64 
spouses prefer efficient meat distributions, we find a substantially reduced efficiency 65 
preference for money compared to meat controlling for potential confounders (adjusted 66 
OR=0.087, 95% CI: 0.02-0.38). Reported marital conflict over paternal disinvestment is 67 
associated with a nearly 13-fold increase in odds of revealing a selfish money distribution 68 
preference. Selfish husbands are significantly more likely than other husbands to be paired 69 
with selfish wives. Lastly, Tsimane husbands and wives are more likely than Western 70 
Europeans to prefer an efficient money distribution, but Tsimane wives are more likely than 71 
Western European wives to exhibit a selfish preference. In sum, preferences for the 72 
distribution of household production surplus support joint and separate interests views of 73 
marriage; a hybrid approach best explains how ecological-, family-, and individual-level 74 
factors influence spousal preferences through their effects on perceptions of marginal gains 75 
within and outside the household. 76 
 77 
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1. INTRODUCTION 101 
Intra-household resource distribution determines energy budgets available for growth, 102 
reproduction and survival, and is thus central to understanding trade-offs underlying human 103 
life history allocations. The sexual division of labour and resources – perhaps the most basic 104 
form of human economic specialization and exchange (Murdock 1949) – is also a highly 105 
complex social relationship, entailing frequent cooperation and altruism but also defections 106 
and spite. Spouses face numerous barriers to generating economic surplus and allocating 107 
resources efficiently among family members, despite generally having more opportunities 108 
and willingness to share information than dyads in non-sexual relationships. Barriers include 109 
conflicting reproductive interests (Bird 1999; Borgerhoff Mulder and Rauch 2009; Gurven et 110 
al. 2009; Maynard Smith 1977; Parker et al. 1972; Smith et al. 2003; Stieglitz et al. 2012a; 111 
Stieglitz et al. 2011; Trivers 1972; Winking et al. 2007), asymmetric information and 112 
unobservable action (Ashraf 2009; Ashraf et al. 2014; Ligon 2011). These barriers can result 113 
in reduced marital quality, verbal and/or physical disputes over appropriate levels of work 114 
effort and use of time and resources (Flinn 1988; Hewlett and Hewlett 2008; Stieglitz et al. 115 
2012b), and can contribute to the development and maintenance of patriarchal social norms 116 
that reinforce and exacerbate these barriers. 117 
A goal of this paper is to examine factors influencing intra-household resource 118 
distribution preferences of spouses using an experimental approach in a small-scale forager-119 
horticultural society, the Tsimane of Bolivia. Given that Tsimane and other subsistence-level 120 
societies worldwide are witnessing rapid changes in livelihood and increasing access to cash- 121 
based economies, another goal is to examine whether and how spousal resource distribution 122 
preferences vary across populations differing in their reliance on cash and the extent to which 123 
spousal labour is more substitutable versus complementary. Despite the complexity 124 
highlighted above that emphasizes both cooperation and conflict among spouses, two 125 
disparate views of the sexual division of labour have dominated the representation of intra-126 
household resource allocations. 127 
According to a joint interest view, the origins of the nuclear family are rooted in a 128 
sexual division of labour where men hunt wild animals and women gather plant foods 129 
(Lovejoy 1981; Murdock and Provost 1973). The pair bond between sexes is viewed as a 130 
cooperative endeavour aimed at joint production of altricial offspring, where women “trade” 131 
paternity certainty for long-term provisioning and protection by men (Isaac 1978a; Lancaster 132 
and Lancaster 1983; Washburn and Lancaster 1968; Wood and Marlowe 2013). Marriage 133 
enables men and women to achieve fitness benefits by producing economies of scale such 134 
that the production of the pair exceeds the summed production of adults working alone 135 
(Gurven and Hill 2009; Gurven et al. 2009; Kaplan and Lancaster 2003). Spouses thus meet 136 
consumption demands by drawing from “pooled energy budgets” (Kramer and Ellison 2010; 137 
Reiches et al. 2009). This view is analogous to the “unitary” model of household decision-138 
making in economics, where the household behaves as if it were a single unit with a single set 139 
of distribution preferences. Spouses either have identical preferences or only one spouse 140 
makes allocation decisions (Becker 1991). Because partner-specific labour proceeds are 141 
pooled in the joint budget, efficient intra-household labour allocation should be that which 142 
maximizes joint production; resource distributions should be efficient regardless of whether a 143 
husband or wife produces the resource. 144 
An alternative separate interests view posits that fitness gains from economic 145 
efficiency alone cannot account for marriage. According to this view men’s work effort in 146 
foraging societies is not primarily motivated by a desire to provision offspring because men’s 147 
game acquisition is unpredictable or unreliable, and once acquired, game is shared widely 148 
with non-household members and not reciprocated (Hawkes 1991; Hawkes and Bliege Bird 149 
2002). This view proposes that men hunt because of the desirable social attention and mating 150 
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benefits that come from providing meat, which is a widely shared public good. Because 151 
hunting is difficult and requires substantial skill, strength, endurance and knowledge, 152 
successful hunting is difficult to fake and serves as an honest signal of underlying male 153 
quality to potential allies, mates and competitors (Bird et al. 2001). This signalling is 154 
effective because visibility of returning with a kill is high, and group members pay careful 155 
attention to men’s hunting returns in order to obtain shares for themselves. Here men’s work 156 
is viewed as a form of mating effort or status competition, rather than familial provisioning, 157 
so marriage is interpreted as a convention of publicly recognized property rights designed to 158 
reduce male mating competition, rather than a cooperative union designed to achieve 159 
economic efficiency. Women therefore choose good hunters because of their presumed 160 
genotypic or phenotypic quality, not because of their willingness to provide household 161 
resources. Intra-household distributions are thus expected to be inefficient (e.g. characterized 162 
by a spouse’s selfishness) due to imperfect enforceability of marital contracts or 163 
informational asymmetries among spouses (Bloch and Rao 2002; Ligon 2011; Lundberg and 164 
Pollak 1993; Mazzocco 2007). 165 
Joint and separate interests views differ in their interpretation of the relative roles of 166 
men and women in the energetics of reproduction and in the life history adaptation. While it 167 
is often acknowledged that household decision-making contains elements of both joint and 168 
separate interests views, empirical studies usually conclude by supporting one view or the 169 
other. The topic has thus generated much controversy in anthropology, with much of the 170 
debate focusing on production decisions (e.g. why hunters target large vs. small game) and 171 
less emphasis on how spouses distribute production surplus. However, hybrid approaches 172 
containing elements of both joint and separate interests views have a long history in 173 
household economics (Bobonis 2009; Chiappori 1988; Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy 174 
and Horney 1981). A key tenet of a joint interest view is that a sexual division of labour and 175 
resources characteristic of marriage facilitates efficiency and maximization of household 176 
economic surplus. Yet an inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage can still be 177 
more advantageous (in terms of utility or fitness) for both spouses than divorce, as supported 178 
by experimental research indicating that spouses are willing to reject joint surplus 179 
maximization for greater personal control over resources (Ashraf 2009; Mani 2011; Munro et 180 
al. 2006), and the observation that spouses pool income for some but not all categories of 181 
consumption (Phipps and Burton 1998). But even if divergent spousal interests are explicitly 182 
acknowledged (Almas et al. 2016; Anderson and Baland 2002; Basu 2006; Duflo and Udry 183 
2004; Gurven et al. 2009; Heath and Tan Under review; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Schaner 184 
2015), the question of whether spousal preferences yield efficient outcomes, and what factors 185 
contribute to household inefficiency remain unresolved. Answering these empirical questions 186 
is essential to advance theoretical models of household behaviour (Del Boca and Flinn 2014; 187 
Munro et al. 2006). 188 
Field experiments are uniquely poised to offer insight into these questions by 189 
manipulating intra-household distribution choices to reveal spousal preferences. Experiments 190 
provide novel inferences about whether and why preferences deviate from efficiency in ways 191 
that prior observational studies cannot. Field experiments also permit more controlled 192 
comparisons of intra-household dynamics across diverse societies. 193 
 194 
1.1. The distribution task 195 
Here we assess Tsimane spousal preferences regarding intra-household allocations 196 
using a “distribution task” (Beblo et al. 2015; Cochard et al. 2014) among spouses from the 197 
same marriage. In this task spouses must decide between two allocations of a resource 198 
between themselves and their partner. Each of five decisions provides the choice between 199 
option A (equally divided between partners) and option B (unequal division between partners 200 
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but always efficient in terms of maximizing joint payoffs). Spouses thus face a trade-off 201 
between equality and efficiency (see Table 1). This equality-efficiency trade-off characterizes 202 
various allocation decisions regarding food, money and other household resources (Behrman 203 
1988; Engle and Nieves 1993; Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1995). The task is not designed to 204 
examine spousal production decisions per se (e.g. who acquires what), but rather how spouses 205 
distribute production surplus. The task permits identification of spouses who maximize joint 206 
payoffs (i.e. efficient), maximize their own payoff (extreme selfish), maximize their partner’s 207 
payoff (extreme altruistic), or who are concerned with partner equality (inequality averse). 208 
No communication between partners is allowed during this one-shot exercise and one cannot 209 
deduce a partner’s revealed preferences. While spousal interactions are obviously repeated 210 
and communication is possible outside of the experiment, many household decisions are 211 
made independently and provide incentives to free-ride on a partner. It must also be noted 212 
that participants have the possibility to choose the unequal but efficient payoff (option B) and 213 
then pool and distribute this payoff equally with a partner after the task. Inequality aversion 214 
thus does not necessarily prevent one from choosing option B, and the number of those 215 
choosing option A is only a lower bound estimate of the number of inequality averse 216 
participants. If pooling and distribution of payoffs after the task is in fact common among 217 
spouses, then one would expect a bias toward maximizing joint payoffs. 218 
 219 
Insert Table 1 here 220 
 221 
Individual preferences elicited by this task help determine the extent to which these 222 
patterns are consistent with joint and separate interests views, or a hybrid approach. A joint 223 
interest view predicts that spouses should always prefer to maximize joint payoffs (option B) 224 
regardless of whether inequality favours a husband or wife because partner-specific incomes 225 
are pooled. A separate interests view suggests that personal gains matter more than the pair’s 226 
total joint gains. A “selfish” individual should choose option A for decisions where their own 227 
payoff is smaller than their partner’s (Table 1A, questions 1-2), and choose option B when 228 
inequality favours oneself (Table 1A, questions 4-5). An “altruistic” individual should do the 229 
opposite. An “inequality-averse” individual should always choose option A. Any 230 
combination of pure individual preferences is possible. Degree of selfishness is related to the 231 
number of A choices in questions 1-2; degree of altruism is related to the number of A 232 
choices in questions 4-5. A separate interests view predicts that conditions increasing spousal 233 
conflict over optimal levels of household investments should promote inefficient, particularly 234 
selfish distribution preferences. A hybrid approach predicts that evidence consistent with both 235 
joint and separate interests views will be found, and that distinct preferences may be 236 
explained by factors impacting perceptions of gains within and outside the household, and 237 
relative bargaining power (Heath and Tan Under review). 238 
 239 
1.2. Study goals and predictions 240 
We determine spousal distribution preferences for two resource types, meat and 241 
money, which have been central to economic exchange throughout human history and thus 242 
central to models of intra-household distribution in anthropology and economics. Money, 243 
unlike meat, serves as an abstract store of value, can be easily converted into other valuable 244 
goods or services, can be easily divided into small or large values, and has only recently (past 245 
few millennia) emerged in human economic exchanges (Davies 1994). The greater fungibility 246 
and liquidity of money have been linked to diminished risk-seeking behaviour than when 247 
food is used as experimental currency (Rosati and Hare 2015). Because money is more 248 
fungible, storable, and easier to conceal than meat, it can more easily be squandered (e.g. on 249 
other sexual relationships, luxury goods, recreation) by a partner at substantial cost to the 250 
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family, and our prior work suggests that Tsimane husbands’ diversions of sporadic wages 251 
away from the family for individual fitness gain (one indicator of paternal disinvestment) are 252 
a principal cause of verbal disputes and physical violence among spouses (Stieglitz et al. 253 
2011). The Tsimane represent an informative case study, relative to fully market-integrated 254 
populations, of how reliance on a mixed economy based primarily on subsistence but with 255 
increasing market involvement and reliance on cash can influence intra-household 256 
distribution preferences. Understanding variability in these preferences informs evolutionary 257 
economic models of the family by examining their basic predictions (e.g. whether household 258 
production surplus is maximized), and builds on a growing body of psychological and 259 
experimental economic research into how different resource types influence decisions 260 
underlying production and distribution (Rosati and Hare 2015). 261 
We hypothesize that greater resource fungibility increases paternal disinvestment, 262 
thus favouring strategies employed by either spouse to protect fungible resources against a 263 
partner’s claims for consumption (Anderson and Baland 2002). If these strategies are 264 
internalized then we should expect revealed preferences in the distribution task for equality 265 
over efficiency for fungible resources that are most vulnerable to exploitation by either 266 
spouse. We test whether greater resource fungibility (i.e. money vs. meat) is associated with 267 
reduced preference for joint efficiency (P1). This prediction is inconsistent with a joint 268 
interest view that spouses are unequivocally motivated to maximize household production 269 
surplus. 270 
In the distribution task distinct motivations can underlie one’s preference for spousal 271 
equality (i.e. household inefficiency) including inequality aversion, selfishness (if efficiency 272 
entails less for oneself than equality), altruism (if efficiency entails less for one’s spouse than 273 
equality) or irrationality (Table 1). These alternatives highlight the fact that equal but 274 
inefficient distribution preferences may still exist in harmonious marriages where spousal 275 
interests converge. To tease apart these alternatives and examine whether potentially 276 
divergent spousal interests affect revealed preferences, we test whether for a perfectly 277 
fungible resource like money, lower self-reported marital quality is associated with inefficient 278 
distribution preferences (P2). Specifically, reported marital conflict over paternal 279 
disinvestment – indicating differential consumption choices between spouses – should be 280 
associated with selfish money distribution preferences by either spouse (P2a). 281 
In a stable marriage market, where spouses provide complementary investments, 282 
resource distribution preferences of spouses should be correlated (Becker 1991) such that 283 
efficient spouses are assortatively paired. This assortment may reflect either one’s preference 284 
for a partner with similar characteristics, consensus preferences in the market for desired 285 
characteristics (e.g. with desirable spouses choosing each other, and less desirable spouses 286 
“settling” for each other), propinquity effects, or convergence (i.e. the tendency for spouses 287 
to become more similar over time). We thus test whether distribution preferences of spouses 288 
are correlated (P3). 289 
Lastly, we hypothesize that population-level differences in economic organization and 290 
the nature and degree of spousal interdependence are associated with population-level 291 
differences in revealed distribution preferences. We test whether Tsimane exhibit a greater 292 
preference for efficiency relative to a comparative Western European sample (P4). Tsimane 293 
reliance on a mixed hunting/foraging/horticultural economy coupled with their high fertility 294 
favours greater sex-specific economic specialization, generating a complementarity where 295 
hunted foods complement gathered/farmed foods, and men’s focus on hunting increases 296 
women’s time spent in childcare or subsistence efforts compatible with childcare (Kaplan and 297 
Lancaster 2003). In contrast, competitive labour/consumer markets and greater labour market 298 
participation and income earned by women can reduce the value of a sexual division of 299 
labour by making men’s and women’s parental investments more substitutable and less 300 
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complementary. When investments are less complementary and more substitutable, as more 301 
commonly occurs in market-integrated Western Europe versus subsistence-level Tsimane, 302 
then spousal resource distribution preferences are expected to be less efficient (all else equal). 303 
 304 
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS 305 
2.1. Study population 306 
Tsimane are semi-sedentary forager-horticulturalists living in the Bolivian Amazon. 307 
They inhabit 90+ villages ranging in size from ~50–550 individuals. They cultivate plantains, 308 
rice, corn, sweet manioc and other crops in small swiddens, and regularly fish and hunt. 309 
These foods comprise >90% of the diet, with the remainder purchased from market stores or 310 
obtained from trade with itinerant merchants. Tsimane live in extended family clusters, where 311 
the majority of food and labour sharing occurs. Modern contraceptives are rarely used and 312 
total fertility rate is high (9 births per woman) (Kaplan et al. 2015; Mcallister et al. 2012). 313 
There are no formal marriage ceremonies and a couple is considered married when 314 
they sleep together in the same house. Mean±SD age at first marriage for men and women in 315 
the present sample is 20.8±2.9 and 17.4±4.0, respectively. Post-marital residence rules are 316 
flexible but emphasize matrilocality early in marriage and patrilocality thereafter. Tsimane 317 
marriages are generally stable: men and women aged 45+ report a mean of 1.3 lifetime 318 
marital partners (Stieglitz et al. 2012a). Polygyny is infrequent (<10% of married adults) and 319 
usually sororal (Winking et al. 2013). Important characteristics of long-term mates for both 320 
sexes include industriousness and a good character (Gurven et al. 2009). Despite a lack of 321 
patriarchal norms and limited residential privacy, physical wife abuse is not uncommon and 322 
when it occurs is often triggered by verbal disputes over paternal disinvestment (Stieglitz et 323 
al. 2012b; Stieglitz et al. 2011). Within marriage there is a belief that a husband’s infidelity 324 
leads to his children’s sickness and potentially death. 325 
‘‘Modernization’’, defined here as a trend toward urban residence and participation in 326 
the market (cash) economy, takes several forms: visits to the closest market town (San Borja), 327 
sale of horticultural and other products, itinerant wage labour (e.g. with ranchers) and 328 
schooling. Most wage opportunities are only available to men, are low income and sporadic. 329 
Many villages now have elementary schools (up to 5th grade) taught by bilingual (Spanish-330 
Tsimane) teachers, many of whom are Tsimane trained by missionaries. Secondary schools 331 
now exist in several larger villages, and young Tsimane adults are starting to become high 332 
school graduates. Generally, however, school attendance rates are low or inconsistent and 333 
adult literacy rate is low (34% in the present sample). Fluency in the Tsimane language 334 
(which is unrelated to Spanish) is universal as Tsimane remains the native language; 39% of 335 
adults (76% male) are fluent in Spanish. Mean±SD years of schooling for men and women is 336 
6.6±4.7 and 3.8±3.8, respectively. 337 
 338 
2.2. Experimental assessment of spousal resource distribution preferences 339 
A “distribution task” consisting of 15 questions was completed by husbands and 340 
wives from the same monogamous marriage (n=53 couples). Neither literacy nor Spanish 341 
fluency was required to participate, as respondents could either state their response and/or 342 
point toward a relevant image depicted on a laminated card to respond (see Electronic 343 
Supplementary Material [ESM] for additional experimental details including examples of 344 
images presented to respondents [Figure S1]). The experiment was conducted in two villages 345 
by JS and an assistant in the Tsimane language to increase informants' comfort levels. Basic 346 
numeracy was required to participate, and all respondents possessed this ability. 347 
For each question, a respondent selects one of two options specifying his/her 348 
preferred allocation of a resource between him/herself and a partner (see Table 1 and (Beblo 349 
et al. 2015; Cochard et al. 2014) for details on the original implementation of this task among 350 
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French and German couples). Tsimane respondents were queried about their distribution 351 
preferences for meat (dried and fresh) and money (Western Europeans were only queried 352 
about money). The task thus consisted of three rounds with five questions per round: round 353 
one choices concerned actual shares of dried meat, where responses determined participant 354 
compensation (see ESM and this section, below); round two choices concerned hypothetical 355 
shares of money (unincentivized); and round three choices concerned hypothetical shares of 356 
fresh meat (unincentivized). Round three was included to assess whether incentivizing 357 
options affects preferences for the same resource type (by comparing round three vs. round 358 
one preferences), and serves as a more natural comparison of preferences across resource 359 
types (by comparing round three vs. round two preferences, neither of which were 360 
incentivized). Across rounds, values of meat (dried or fresh) and money presented to 361 
respondents in each image are equivalent (e.g. 0.67 kg of actual dried meat = 30 Bolivianos 362 
[Bs] depicted in the image = 23.6 oz. of fresh meat depicted in the image). Any difference in 363 
preferences for meat versus money therefore cannot be attributed to a difference in value 364 
across resource types. Rounds, questions and options are presented in random order (i.e. not 365 
as shown in Table 1). 366 
To recruit study participants, a radio message1 was first presented in the Tsimane 367 
language that briefly introduced study objectives and logistics (e.g. participating villages, 368 
sampling restriction to married adults only, participant compensation). The following day the 369 
researchers held a village meeting, during which study objectives and protocols were 370 
explained in greater detail and any married meeting attendee was invited to participate with 371 
his/her spouse. The first village meeting was well attended since it was also held, 372 
coincidentally, to discuss plans for well construction by an independent engineering 373 
organization. High meeting attendance increased the pool of potential study participants, and 374 
limited self-selection by demographics, schooling and other factors (e.g. marital quality). 375 
During both village meetings and individual trials we explained to participants that 376 
they would receive two pay-outs of dried meat: 1) a show-up gift of 0.67 kg for each 377 
participant (worth 30 Bs or $4.30 USD), and 2) up to another 0.67 kg (but as little as 0 kg) 378 
based on their distribution task responses in round one. We explained that compensation 379 
would be provided after all couples in the village participated. We selected dried meat as 380 
compensation because meat is always in high demand, regardless of market involvement, and 381 
because it is storable (~1 month). Participants thus did not feel pressure to consume the meat 382 
immediately and could freely choose whether and how to distribute it. Money was not used as 383 
compensation to avoid commodification and to minimize sample bias (e.g. money may 384 
appeal more to individuals with greater market involvement, thus potentially biasing 385 
participation rates). The total value of compensation per respondent was equivalent to one-386 
half to one day’s worth of wage labour, as has been used in economic experiments worldwide 387 
(Henrich et al. 2005). To incentivize decisions and ensure anonymity, one response in round 388 
one for each couple was randomly selected for the second pay-out. This pay-out was 389 
determined by two dice rolls: one to select whether the husband’s or wife’s round one 390 
response would be used, and another to choose the response. We repeatedly emphasized that 391 
responses were private and that a spouse would have no opportunity to discover one’s own 392 
responses even after receiving compensation. Each participant received both pay-outs of 393 
dried meat simultaneously (i.e. in the same plastic bag), and could not deduce a partner’s 394 
responses from the weight of the bag. During the experiment participants could not 395 
communicate with others, including spouses. 396 
                                                          
1A former Protestant Mission maintains a radio station in San Borja which communicates messages to 
listeners at fixed hours each day. Most Tsimane hear these messages (or have a neighbour who hears 
messages and then informs non-listeners) on their personal home radios. 
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Distribution task instructions were translated into Spanish and then Tsimane by a 397 
bilingual Tsimane research assistant and JS. To test translation accuracy the Tsimane 398 
instructions were then back-translated into Spanish by a different Tsimane researcher, and 399 
discussions among the two Tsimane and JS ensued until an effective translation was found. 400 
Considerable care was taken to explain the instructions simply, both verbally and using the 401 
laminated cards (see ESM). After explaining instructions to each respondent in private, the 402 
respondent was asked two questions to test their comprehension. All respondents correctly 403 
answered both questions before beginning the study. Respondents were informed that there 404 
was no right or wrong way to complete the task, and were repeatedly encouraged to ask 405 
questions if anything was unclear. To further ensure comprehension we explained to 406 
participants how a given resource was actually distributed between spouses while the 407 
participant was presented with each question (15 questions*2 options/question*2 408 
partners/option=60 explanations/respondent). This combination of simultaneous visual 409 
presentation and verbal explanation ruled out the possibility that individuals were responding 410 
by rote without actually considering the efficiency-equality trade-off. Indeed, for each 411 
question most participants were observed to be correctly “doing the math” prior to 412 
responding. Participants were encouraged to carefully consider each option before 413 
responding, and to use as much time as needed. Once a response was provided the participant 414 
was asked if he/she was certain, while also being reminded of the implications for not having 415 
chosen the alternative. Participants were also asked to explain their responses using an open-416 
ended format (i.e. “Why did you choose option A and not B?”). From these open-ended 417 
questions it was clear that respondents understood the task and actively considered the 418 
alternative on a question-by-question basis. The experimenter looked only at the laminated 419 
card (or bowls of dried meat) when participants responded to avoid inadvertent social cuing. 420 
To gain insight into respondents’ task perception, respondents were asked post-421 
experiment whether task decisions resembled those encountered in daily life (unrealistic=0, 422 
slightly realistic=1, realistic=2) and whether decisions were difficult (easy=0, slightly 423 
difficult=1, difficult=2). Over half of respondents (62% men, 55% women) perceived 424 
decisions as realistic; 68% of men and 66% of women perceived decisions as easy.  425 
 426 
2.3. Self-reported marital quality and socio-demographics 427 
After the experiment, participants were queried about the frequency of serious verbal 428 
disputes with their spouse in the past three months (0=none, 1=once per month, 2=once per 429 
week, 3=several per week, 4=daily). Participants then reported, without prompts, the cause of 430 
their most frequent serious verbal disputes in the past three months. This open-ended, free-431 
listing technique was used because it does not force respondents into selecting preconceived 432 
categories and allows for a more thorough account than otherwise possible. We focused on 433 
the most serious disputes because we reasoned that they would provide the most accurate 434 
recall. No restriction was placed on the number of disputes that one could mention. After 435 
each dispute was reported, we systematically queried participants about the relevance of other 436 
potential causes (Stieglitz et al. 2012b; Stieglitz et al. 2011). For example, if a wife reported a 437 
dispute over a husband’s excessive alcohol consumption (one indicator of paternal 438 
disinvestment), we then asked the wife whether this dispute was also caused by the husband’s 439 
neglect of particular subsistence tasks, childcare or domestic tasks, the husband’s excessive 440 
social visitation, or other causes (see ESM for additional details). 441 
Age and marital duration were estimated based on a combination of methods 442 
described elsewhere (Winking et al. 2013). Parity, schooling, Spanish fluency and literacy 443 
were assessed during annual census updates conducted by the Tsimane Health and Life 444 
History Project. After the experiment husbands were asked about their wage labour 445 
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involvement (i.e. time elapsed since the last wage opportunity, and daily earnings from this 446 
opportunity) to gain further insight into market participation. 447 
Mean±SD age of husbands and wives is 34.8±12.2 and 30.9±12.0, respectively. 448 
Mean±SD marital duration is 12.4±10.5 years (range: 1 month-46 years), and mean±SD 449 
number of joint children is 3.2±3.5 (range: 0-13). 450 
Procedures for all methods were approved by the UNM Human Subjects Review 451 
Board, Tsimane government, village leaders and study participants. 452 
 453 
2.4. Data analysis 454 
Outcomes include responses to individual distribution task questions, and aggregate 455 
responses in a given round (see electronic appendix). The latter are used to classify 456 
respondents as follows: always maximize joint payoffs (efficient), always maximize a 457 
partner’s payoff (extreme altruist), or always maximize own payoff (extreme selfish). To 458 
classify other respondents whose aggregate preferences are not represented, we calculate a 459 
ratio of “own payoff” to “couple payoff” summed over the five questions in a round. We 460 
calculate for the five questions the sum of own payoff divided by the sum of couple payoffs, 461 
which corresponds to the share of the total payoff retained by the respondent. If this share 462 
equals 0.5 then respondents are classified as “symmetric-inequality averse” (i.e. their 463 
preference is symmetric around question #3); if this share is greater (or lower) than 0.5 464 
respondents are classified as “asymmetric selfish” (or “asymmetric altruist”). Respondents 465 
who did not select option B for question #3 are classified as “irrational”. 466 
We utilize both within- (P1) and between-subjects (P2-P4) comparisons to test 467 
predictions. Chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests are used for descriptive analyses. 468 
Generalized estimating equations (GEE) analyses are used to model effects of resource type 469 
on the probability of choosing an efficient distribution. This method accounts for the 470 
correlated structure of a dependent variable arising from repeated measures on the same 471 
individual (Liang and Zeger 1986). There is no standard absolute goodness-of-fit measure 472 
with the GEE method (Pan 2001), which does not make distributional assumptions and uses a 473 
quasi-likelihood rather than full likelihood estimation approach (see Pan 2001 for a general 474 
formulation). Logistic regression is used for between-subjects analyses to model the 475 
probability of being classified as efficient (or selfish, etc.) based on aggregate preferences. A 476 
stepwise approach is used to fit regression models. Parameter estimates are reported as odds 477 
ratios (ORs) or predicted probabilities. GEE and logistic regressions assume that between-478 
subjects measurements are independent, which may not be realistic if spousal distribution 479 
preferences are correlated (P3). We therefore repeated analyses after including a random 480 
intercept for couple ID in mixed effects logistic regressions, although couple ID did not yield 481 
a significant variance estimate or affect results. Fixed effects of village ID and distribution 482 
task question number (indicating degree and direction of inequality) were also not significant 483 
and omitted. For all continuous predictors we tested for non-linear associations using 484 
quadratic or cubic terms. To test for population-level differences in money distribution 485 
preferences we merged French and German samples into one “Western European” sample; 486 
differences between French and Germans have been reported elsewhere (Beblo et al. 2015) 487 
and are not of primary interest here. 488 
 489 
3. RESULTS 490 
3.1. Classification of Tsimane spouses based on aggregate distribution task preferences 491 
No respondent is classified as “extreme selfish” or “irrational” for either resource type 492 
(meat [dried or fresh] or money). When meat distribution options are incentivized (dried 493 
meat), all respondents choose efficiency (Figure 1). When meat distribution options are not 494 
incentivized (fresh meat), all husbands and nearly all wives (96%) still choose efficiency, 495 
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indicating that incentivizing options does not strongly affect preferences for the same general 496 
resource type. 497 
For money, most husbands (87%) and wives (70%) choose efficiency. Wives not 498 
consistently preferring efficiency are either asymmetric selfish (hereafter “selfish” unless 499 
otherwise noted, 13%), asymmetric altruistic (8%), symmetric-inequality averse (hereafter 500 
“symmetric”, 6%) or extreme altruistic (4%). Selfish wives are more likely than other wives 501 
to report a spousal dispute over paternal disinvestment (86% vs. 17%, Fisher’s Exact 502 
p=0.001) (Table S1), but do not differ from other wives in terms of demographics, indicators 503 
of modernization or task perception. Husbands not consistently preferring efficiency are 504 
either selfish (6%), symmetric (6%) or extreme altruistic (2%)2 (Figure 1). Efficient husbands 505 
are more likely than other husbands to be fluent in Spanish (63% vs. 29%, Fisher’s Exact 506 
p=0.096) and earn more per day from their last wage opportunity (mean=68 vs. 57 Bs, Mann-507 
Whitney U p=0.081) (Table S2). Wives are less likely than husbands to choose efficiency 508 
(χ²=4.50, p=0.034, 106 individuals), are more likely to be asymmetric altruistic (Fisher’s 509 
Exact p=0.059), but are not more likely to be selfish (χ²=1.77, p=0.184). 510 
 511 
Insert Figure 1 here 512 
 513 
3.2. Is greater resource fungibility (i.e. money vs. meat) associated with reduced preference 514 
for joint efficiency (P1)? Yes. 515 
Tsimane respondents selected the inefficient option for 6.1% of observations3, and 516 
90.4% (47/52) of inefficient responses occur with money as the resource type. Probability of 517 
choosing efficiency is much lower for money (adjusted ORMoney=0.087, 95% CI: 0.02-0.38, 518 
p=0.001) after controlling for potential confounders including demographics and indicators of 519 
marital quality, modernization and task perception (Table S3). Holding significant 520 
confounders constant (at the sample mean), the predicted probability of choosing efficiency is 521 
0.99 for meat and 0.92 for money; these probabilities do not change after including fixed 522 
effects of village ID and distribution task question number (indicating degree and direction of 523 
inequality), which are not significant. Across resource types, inefficient responses of both 524 
husbands and wives are equally prevalent based on whether a husband or wife receives the 525 
greater resource share (i.e. half of inefficient responses [husbands: 8/16, wives: 18/36] occur 526 
when a wife receives the greater share, and half occur when a husband receives the greater 527 
share) (Figure S2). Resource type effect size is therefore similar if regressions are restricted 528 
to question #’s 1-2 (inequality favours wife) or to question #’s 4-5 (inequality favours 529 
husband). Inclusion of separate interaction terms between resource type and either age, sex or 530 
number of joint children does not yield significant parameter estimates. 531 
 532 
3.3. Is lower self-reported marital quality associated with inefficient – particularly selfish – 533 
money distribution preferences (P2)? Yes. 534 
Inefficient preferences can result from selfishness, altruism or inequality aversion, but 535 
analyses in section 3.2 do not distinguish between these alternatives. To test P2 it is therefore 536 
necessary to conduct between-subjects analyses using aggregate responses. 537 
                                                          
2Total≠100 due to rounding. 
3For consistency the sample is restricted to distribution preferences for fresh meat and money (both of 
which are unincentivized and elicited using hypothetical resources); preferences for dried meat (which 
are incentivized and elicited using the actual resource) are omitted from analyses. Moreover, for each 
resource type responses to question #3 (where there is no efficiency-equality trade-off) are omitted 
because no respondent selected the irrational option A. The analysis sample is thus 848 observations 
(2 resource types [fresh meat and money]*4 questions/type*106 respondents). 
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Sixty-nine percent of respondents (66% husbands, 72% wives, χ²=0.396, p=0.529) 538 
reported having a serious verbal dispute with a partner in the past three months. Respondents 539 
who reported having a dispute are more likely paired with someone who likewise reported a 540 
dispute (χ²=6.324, p=0.012), indicating spousal consistency in reporting. Further, respondents 541 
who reported having a dispute over paternal disinvestment (15% husbands, 26% wives, 542 
χ²=2.065, p=0.151) are more likely paired with someone who also reported this same type of 543 
dispute (Fisher’s Exact p=0.023). Disputes over paternal disinvestment are among the most 544 
commonly free-listed disputes by both sexes (Figure S3). 545 
As predicted, those reporting paternal disinvestment disputes are more likely to be 546 
selfish (ORDisinvestment=12.6, 95% CI: 2.93-54.28, p=0.001). Respondents reporting any 547 
disinvestment dispute trend toward being less efficient (ORDisinvestment=0.38, 95% CI: 0.14-548 
1.07, p=0.067), but this negative effect weakens slightly after including demographic controls 549 
(ORDisinvestment=0.47, 95% CI: 0.16-1.39, p=0.172, controlling for age, age2 and sex). 550 
However, respondents reporting any recent dispute are not less likely than other respondents 551 
to choose efficiency, but trend toward being less altruistic after controlling for potential 552 
confounders (adjusted ORDispute Reported=0.258, 95% CI: <0.01-2.02, p=0.1) (Table 2). No 553 
indicator of modernization or task perception is significantly associated with aggregate 554 
distribution task preferences in bivariate or stepwise regressions, thus ruling out these 555 
potential confounders. The fact that preferences for inefficiency and greater selfishness are 556 
associated with paternal disinvestment disputes – but not any dispute (Table 2) – reduces the 557 
possibility that other types of marital conflicts influence this association. Indeed, in separate 558 
analyses (not shown) aggregate distribution task preferences among respondents reporting 559 
disputes other than paternal disinvestment (e.g. over a wife’s “neglect” of domestic work, see 560 
Figure S3) are not significantly different from respondents reporting no such disputes. We 561 
find no significant interaction effect of sex and dispute reports (over paternal disinvestment 562 
or other causes) on preferences. Similarly, no indicator of modernization interacts with 563 
dispute reports to affect preferences. 564 
 565 
Insert Table 2 here 566 
 567 
3.4. Are distribution preferences of spouses correlated (P3)? Partially. 568 
To test P3 we restrict analyses to money distribution preferences given limited 569 
variance in meat distribution preferences. Seventy-four percent of efficient husbands (n=46) 570 
are paired with efficient wives, compared to 33% of selfish (n=3), 0% of altruistic (n=1) and 571 
67% of symmetric husbands (n=3) (Figure 2). Efficient husbands are less likely than other 572 
husbands to be paired with selfish wives (ORHusband efficient=0.127, 95% CI: 0.02-0.78, 573 
p=0.026, n=53), and efficient husbands are more likely (albeit not significantly) paired with 574 
efficient wives (ORHusband efficient=3.778, 95% CI: 0.74-19.38, p=0.11). Sixty-seven percent of 575 
selfish husbands are paired with selfish wives, compared to 9% of efficient, 0% of altruistic 576 
and 33% of symmetric husbands (Figure 2). Selfish husbands are more likely paired with 577 
selfish wives (ORHusband selfish=18.000, 95% CI: 1.38-235.69, p=0.028). These results – while 578 
based on a small sample size – do not change controlling for schooling of each spouse, which 579 
is moderately positively correlated (Pearson r=0.37, p=0.006). Results also do not change 580 
controlling for task perception of each spouse, which is positively correlated for one but not 581 
both indicators (agree task easy: χ²=4.02, p=0.045; agree task realistic: χ²=0.29, p=0.591). 582 
Spousal distribution preferences are not more strongly correlated with increasing martial 583 
duration, suggesting minimal/no convergence in preferences over time. 584 
 585 
Insert Figure 2 here 586 
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3.5. Are efficient money distribution preferences more common among Tsimane than Western 587 
Europeans (P4)? Yes. 588 
We restrict analyses of P4 to money distribution preferences since Western Europeans 589 
were not queried about preferences for other resource types. Tsimane husbands and wives are 590 
more likely than Western Europeans to choose efficiency (husbands: 87% vs. 56%, χ²=15.87, 591 
p<0.001, n=209; wives: 70% vs. 53%, χ²=4.80, p=0.028, n=209) (Figure 3; Table S4). The 592 
group-level difference is significant controlling for age and sex (adjusted ORTsimane=2.631, 593 
95% CI: 1.56-4.45, p<0.001, n=418), and is not attenuated after including other demographic 594 
covariates (marital duration, spousal age difference or number of co-resident children). 595 
Inclusion of a group-by-age interaction term yields a significant parameter estimate 596 
(interaction p=0.01, controlling for sex), indicating that Western Europeans but not Tsimane 597 
are less likely to choose efficiency with age (Figure S4). Inclusion of additional interaction 598 
terms between group and other demographic predictors does not yield significant parameter 599 
estimates. 600 
Despite no Tsimane being classified as “extreme selfish”, Tsimane wives are more 601 
likely than Western Europeans to exhibit selfish preferences (asymmetric selfish or extreme 602 
selfish) (wives: 13% vs. 3%, Fisher’s Exact p=0.007; husbands: 6% vs. 7%, Fisher’s Exact 603 
p=0.506). There is a significant group-by-sex interaction effect on the probability of 604 
exhibiting any selfish preference (interaction p=0.033, controlling for age) (Figure S5). 605 
Inclusion of other demographic predictors as either main effects or interacting with group 606 
does not yield significant parameter estimates. 607 
There are no group-level differences in the probability of exhibiting altruistic 608 
preferences (asymmetric altruist or extreme altruist) (Figure 3; Table S4). Tsimane husbands 609 
and wives are less likely than Western Europeans to prefer a symmetrical distribution 610 
(husbands: 6% vs. 20%, χ²=5.87, p=0.015; wives: 6% vs. 30%, χ²=12.51, p<0.001). These 611 
group-level differences are significant controlling for age and sex (not shown); inclusion of 612 
other demographic predictors as either main effects or interacting with group does not yield 613 
significant parameter estimates. 614 
 615 
Insert Figure 3 here 616 
 617 
4. DISCUSSION 618 
Using an experimental approach stipulating a trade-off between household efficiency 619 
and spousal equality in distributing production surplus, we find that Tsimane spouses 620 
strongly prefer efficient meat distributions. Meat distribution preferences are similar for 621 
unincentivized responses (Figure 1), and are consistent with a joint interest view that 622 
marriage in small-scale societies achieves economic efficiency and maximization of 623 
household production surplus (Isaac 1978b; Kaplan and Lancaster 2003; Lancaster and 624 
Lancaster 1983; Lovejoy 1981; Murdock and Provost 1973). The efficiency preference is 625 
apparent even though our distribution task does not specify who acquired the resource, which 626 
could in principle minimize salience of the perceived benefits provided by sex-specific 627 
economic specialization and complementarities between spouses’ distinct productive efforts. 628 
The fact that Tsimane women in particular prefer household efficiency – regardless of 629 
whether a wife or husband possesses meat – is not compatible with a separate interests view 630 
that women’s mate choice is indifferent to men’s willingness to provide acquired game for 631 
household consumption. 632 
Consistent with P1 we find a much stronger efficiency preference for meat compared 633 
to money, despite the fact that both resources are almost exclusively acquired by men in this 634 
socioecological context. Including numerous potential confounders does not influence the 635 
strong effect size of resource type, equivalent to an 11-fold increase in odds of choosing 636 
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efficiency for meat compared to money. While most spouses prefer efficiency over other 637 
distributions (Figure 1), inefficient preferences result from a combination of selfishness, 638 
altruism and inequality aversion. This variability in preferences is consistent with a hybrid 639 
approach containing elements of both joint and separate interests views of marriage (Table 640 
1B) (Gurven et al. 2009). The preference for household inefficiency may be related to intra-641 
household inequality aversion since no Tsimane prefers to maximize his/her own monetary 642 
payoff (extreme selfishness) and only 3% prefer to maximize a partner’s payoff (extreme 643 
altruism). Despite the possibility of post-experiment payoff pooling resulting in an equal 644 
distribution regardless of revealed preferences, 22% of Tsimane (13% men, 30% women) 645 
prefer the inefficient but equal money distribution option at least once (47/530 round two 646 
observations [8.9%]), providing a lower bound prevalence of inequality aversion. 647 
Our finding that meat and money elicit different preferences is broadly consistent with 648 
prior experimental and neuroimaging research indicating that people make value-based 649 
decisions differently when faced with decisions about money versus either food or other 650 
concrete inedible payoffs (Rosati and Hare 2015). People exhibit fewer risk-seeking 651 
preferences and reduced reward discounting for money, even in small amounts, compared to 652 
desirable food or inedible prizes. Distinct brain regions also appear to underlie value-based 653 
decisions based on whether payoffs are monetary or not (Clithero and Rangel 2014). It has 654 
thus been suggested that different psychological processes motivate decisions about abstract 655 
compared to concrete payoffs of similar value. Money may uniquely influence decision-656 
making because of its fungibility and liquidity, as people exhibit fewer risk-seeking 657 
preferences in experiments when money can be freely exchanged for other payoffs compared 658 
to when this ability is constrained (Rosati and Hare 2015). Taken together, this prior research 659 
– usually conducted in Western populations and in contexts where payoffs are not divided 660 
with others – suggests that expectations about resource fungibility and liquidity directly affect 661 
consumption decisions. The present study generalizes to a non-Western subsistence-level 662 
population the finding that money elicits different preferences for use compared to food, and 663 
provides an ultimate explanation for why resource fungibility and liquidity is central to 664 
understanding consumption and distribution preferences within households. 665 
We hypothesized that the greater fungibility of money compared to meat, and as a 666 
result the greater potential to squander money for individual fitness gain at a cost to the 667 
family (Stieglitz et al. 2012a), favours unique individual strategies to protect money against a 668 
partner’s claims for consumption (Anderson and Baland 2002). As expected if these 669 
strategies are internalized, we find that spouses are more likely to reject household efficiency 670 
for an equal distribution of the highly fungible resource most vulnerable to exploitation by a 671 
partner. This finding is not compatible with a joint interest view that spouses are 672 
unequivocally motivated to maximize household production regardless of resource type. 673 
Resource fungibility may be one of several resource characteristics (e.g. in addition to 674 
variance in daily acquisition, degree of complementarity with other household investments) 675 
that influence perceptions of the marginal gains from individual consumption and distribution 676 
(Kaplan and Gurven 2005). 677 
Consistent with P2 we find that reported marital conflict over paternal disinvestment 678 
is associated with a nearly 13-fold increase in odds of revealing a selfish money distribution 679 
preference (Table 2). Greater preference for costly selfishness is uniquely associated with 680 
recent paternal disinvestment disputes, but not any other recent marital disputes, which is 681 
broadly consistent with prior research indicating that paternal disinvestment is the principal 682 
cause of intense verbal and physical conflict among Tsimane spouses (Stieglitz et al. 2012b). 683 
Paternal disinvestment thus presents a principal barrier to allocating household resources 684 
efficiently, as suggested by a separate interests view that spousal disagreement over 685 
appropriate use of household resources leads to costly selfish actions (Bloch and Rao 2002; 686 
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Borgerhoff Mulder and Rauch 2009; Mani 2011; Munro et al. 2006). Experimental research 687 
in rural Kenya demonstrates that greater spousal heterogeneity in discounting preferences – 688 
similarly indicating differential consumption choices – leads to inefficient and selfish savings 689 
behaviour, whereas greater spousal homogeneity in preferences facilitates household 690 
efficiency in savings (Schaner 2015). Our results suggest that greater resource fungibility per 691 
se can promote costly selfish actions even among spouses with homogenous allocation 692 
preferences, and that actions are explained by factors impacting perceptions of individual 693 
fitness gains within and outside of marriage. 694 
Despite a small sample size, we find partial support for P3, as selfish husbands are 695 
significantly more likely than other husbands to be paired with selfish wives. Marital 696 
assortment may result from “market forces”, i.e., consensus in the marriage market regarding 697 
desirable partner characteristics. If selfishness is a characteristic that most find undesirable in 698 
a partner, then selfish individuals should attract fewer partners and thus pair with the less 699 
desirable (in this case, other selfish individuals). Similar logic may explain why efficient 700 
husbands are less likely paired with selfish wives, although we cannot rule out alternative 701 
explanations (e.g. propinquity effects, preference for a partner with similar characteristics as 702 
oneself). Among Tsimane, work effort and productivity are important mate choice criteria for 703 
both sexes, spouses engage in similar levels of work effort, and time allocation to work for 704 
each spouse is positively associated with fertility (Gurven et al. 2009). Positive assortment by 705 
personality is also evident for traits such as agreeableness and conscientiousness 706 
(unpublished data), which may facilitate household coordination and efficiency. Spousal 707 
distribution preferences are not more strongly correlated with increasing marital duration, 708 
which ranges from one month to 46 years in the present sample. Assortment may therefore be 709 
due to initial preferences upon union formation rather than preference convergence over time. 710 
Odds of being paired with an efficient wife are nearly four-fold higher for efficient versus 711 
inefficient husbands, although the effect is not significant because of the small sample size of 712 
inefficient husbands (n=7, see Figure 2). Given the percentage of efficient and inefficient 713 
husbands paired with efficient wives (74% and 43%, respectively), a post-hoc power analysis 714 
indicates that a sample size of 125 husbands (a 136% increase from the current sample size) 715 
would be required to attain 80% power at an alpha of 0.05 with an identical unbalanced 716 
design. Obtaining this larger sample would have entailed visiting multiple additional Tsimane 717 
villages, which was not possible given various constraints. Nevertheless, prior experimental 718 
studies with larger sample sizes in rural Africa find that spouses with similar characteristics 719 
(e.g. level of schooling) generate greater household surplus (Munro et al. 2006; Schaner 720 
2015), which is broadly consistent with the findings reported here. 721 
Consistent with P4, we find that Tsimane are more likely than Western Europeans to 722 
choose efficiency (Figure 3). We suggest that group-level differences in economic 723 
organization and degree of complementarity in parental investments motivate the observed 724 
differences in distribution preferences. Multiple lines of evidence (Henrich et al. 2005) 725 
indicate that common economic tasks affect basic values underlying preference formation, 726 
and that these values in turn affect temperament and behaviour. If these values are 727 
internalized, generalized and expressed, and if learning processes are adaptive and flexible, 728 
then the greater preference for monetary efficiency among Tsimane in a novel experimental 729 
situation may not be so surprising in light of their comparatively limited market exposure. 730 
Specialization in household production by sex that is characteristic of forager-horticulturalists 731 
can inform one’s expectations of a spouse’s preferences, such that even in an experiment 732 
Tsimane may expect a partner to behave in a similarly efficient manner. These expectations 733 
can sustain a high degree of cooperation throughout marriage, which may help explain why 734 
Tsimane efficiency preferences vary little with age (unlike for Western Europeans, see Figure 735 
S4). At the same time, a greater preference for selfishness among Tsimane women compared 736 
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to Western European women (Figure S5) suggests a willingness to sacrifice household 737 
efficiency for greater personal control of fungible and liquid resources. This preference can 738 
indicate a broader adaptive strategy employed by Tsimane women to protect money against a 739 
husband’s claims for consumption, especially because monetary access is often male-740 
dominated and can result in costly paternal disinvestment. 741 
 742 
4.1. Strengths and limitations 743 
The research design minimizes response and sampling biases. Data are obtained 744 
independently from both spouses instead of only one spouse, permitting assessment of 745 
spousal consistency in reporting. Indeed, we find consistency in reporting recent verbal 746 
disputes in marriage (section 3.3). Study recruitment and participant compensation (section 747 
2.2) also limited self-selection by demographics, degree of modernization and marital quality. 748 
Moreover we can rule out potential “contamination effects”, which are expected if Tsimane 749 
participants, after completing the study, informed others of what to expect and thus biased 750 
others’ distribution task responses. To test for such effects we examined whether distribution 751 
preferences within a village changed over time but found no such evidence. Regarding 752 
external validity, a majority of respondents indicated that distribution task questions 753 
resembled the types of decisions encountered in daily life (section 2.2). Variability in task 754 
perception did not significantly affect any outcome or modify effect sizes of primary 755 
predictors. The fact that no Tsimane exhibited an irrational distribution preference and the 756 
fact that all Tsimane correctly answered both pre-task comprehension questions suggests that 757 
Tsimane understood the task. Results of cross-population analyses (section 3.5) are not 758 
affected if irrational Western Europeans are omitted from analyses. Our study is the first to 759 
our knowledge to systematically compare resource distribution preferences among couples in 760 
subsistence-level and fully market-integrated populations using a common experimental 761 
framework. 762 
Nevertheless, resource transfers outside of the “laboratory” obviously cannot be 763 
prevented in experiments among spouses. If post-experiment transfers are indeed common 764 
then this affects our ability to correctly classify spouses based on their aggregate preferences 765 
(e.g. an “asymmetric-selfish” wife may transfer half of her resources to a husband post-766 
experiment and thus prefer inequality aversion to selfishness). Relatedly, there are other 767 
possible explanations of altruistic preferences; altruistic spouses may allow or expect a 768 
partner to divide a resource equally among co-resident kin, and thus altruism could be a sign 769 
of partner respect even at the expense of household efficiency. Perhaps this helps explain 770 
why degree of offspring dependency is associated with inefficient distributions (see Table S3, 771 
Table 2). Alternatively, altruism could be a form of extra-pair mating effort, as predicted by a 772 
separate interests view of marriage, if reputational benefits of altruism entail extra-pair 773 
mating opportunities or other social benefits. Our inability to validate revealed preferences 774 
with subsequent behavioural measures represents a significant study limitation that hinders 775 
stronger interpretation of observed empirical patterns. Another study limitation is the small 776 
sample size, especially for testing P3. 777 
 778 
4.2. Conclusion 779 
Examination of spousal preferences for distributing household production surplus 780 
reveals evidence for both joint and separate interests views of marriage (Anderson et al. 781 
1999). Shared and distinct spousal preferences are explained by ecological-, family-, and 782 
individual-level factors impacting perceptions of marginal gains within and outside the 783 
household. A hybrid approach explains intra- and inter-population variation in distribution 784 
preferences. Determining whether such preferences predict marital behaviour and outcomes 785 
should be a focus of future research. 786 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. A) Distribution task design. The task consists of three rounds and five questions/round. Respondents choose option A or B for each 
question. Spouses face a trade-off between equality and efficiency for every question except #3, where options A and B both offer equal 
divisions but B is also efficient. In round one respondents indicate their preferences for actual shares of dried meat (X=0.67 kilograms), and 
responses determine compensation. Round two choices concern hypothetical shares of money (unincentivized; X=30 Bolivianos). Round three 
choices concern hypothetical shares of fresh meat (unincentivized; X=0.67 kilograms). Rounds, questions and options are presented in random 
order (not as shown here). B) Classification of individuals based on their aggregate preferences. Efficient individuals maximize joint payoffs. 
Selfish individuals retain a disproportionate share (>0.5) of joint payoffs for themselves, whereas altruists retain <0.5 for themselves. Symmetric 
individuals choose equality instead of efficiency at least once, retaining an equal share (0.5) of joint payoffs as a partner. 
 
A) Option A  Option B  
Question # in a given round 
Payoff for 
self 
Payoff for 
partner  
Payoff for 
self 
Payoff for 
partner  
1 X*0.33 X*0.33  0 X  
2 X*0.33 X*0.33  X*0.25 X*0.75  
3 X*0.33 X*0.33  X*0.5 X*0.5  
4 X*0.33 X*0.33  X*0.75 X*0.25  
5 X*0.33 X*0.33  X 0  
       
B) Preference (#’s below indicate question #’s above)  
Classification of individuals based on aggregate 
preferences Option A  Option B 
Consistent with which 
view of marriage? 
EFFICIENT (maximize joint payoff)   1-5 Joint interest 
EXTREME ALTRUISTIC (max. spouse’s payoff) 4-5  1-3 Hybrid 
EXTREME SELFISH (max. own payoff) 1-2  3-5 Separate interests 
ASYMMETRIC- ALTRUISTIC Multiple possibilities Hybrid 
ASYMMETRIC - SELFISH Multiple possibilities Hybrid 
SYMMETRIC-INEQUALITY AVERSE Multiple possibilities Hybrid 
IRRATIONAL 3   Neither 
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Table 2. Determinants of being classified as efficient, selfish, altruistic, or symmetric-inequality averse based on aggregate money distribution preferences 
(n=53 husbands and wives from the same marriage). Logistic regression coefficients are presented as odds ratios. 
 Bivariate models  Stepwise models 
          
Predictor Efficient Selfish Altruistich Symmetric  Efficient Selfish Altruistich Symmetric 
Indicator of reduced marital quality          
Any dispute reporteda (vs. not reported) 1.237 1.061 0.311* 2.353  ----- ----- 0.258* ----- 
Any dispute over paternal disinvestmentb (vs. not reported) 0.380* 12.600*** -----i 0.752  ----- 12.600*** -----i ----- 
Demographic          
Agec (years) 0.806 0.982 5.928* 1.009  0.743* ----- ----- ----- 
Age2 (years) 1.003* ----- 0.969* -----  1.004* ----- ----- ----- 
Sex=male 2.842** 0.394 0.151* 1.000  3.314** ----- 0.108* ----- 
# joint children < age 10d 0.669** 1.184 2.122** 1.146  ----- ----- 2.148** ----- 
Indicator of modernization          
Schoolinge (years) 1.012 1.063 0.666* 1.057  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Fluent in Spanish (vs. not or partially) 2.066 0.654 0.246 0.782  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Partner schoolingf (years) 0.916* 1.113* 1.013 1.080  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Time since H’s last wage opportunityg (months) 1.033 0.973 0.993 0.905  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
H’s daily wage from last opportunityg (2014 Bs) 1.012 0.984 0.994 0.992  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Task perception          
Realistic (vs. not) 1.739 0.437 0.943 0.695  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Easy (vs. not) 2.253* 0.289* 1.250 0.471  ----- ----- ----- ----- 
aRefers to serious verbal disputes with a partner in the past three months.     bDispute causes were free-listed by respondents without prompts. Paternal disinvestment 
includes excessive alcohol consumption, infidelity (perceived or real) or irresponsible use of money (see Stieglitz et al. 2011, 2012).     cMarital duration is strongly 
correlated with age (Pearson r=0.83, p<0.001) and is not a significant predictor in univariate models; marital duration is thus omitted. Spousal age difference (H-W, 
years) is also not a significant predictor and is omitted.     dWhether a respondent has any living children from prior unions (vs. none) is not a significant predictor and is 
omitted (# of children from prior unions [total or < age 10] is also not significant).     eLiteracy (vs. none or partial) is not a significant predictor and is omitted.     
fNeither partner literacy nor partner Spanish fluency are significant predictors and are omitted.     gAs reported by husband; logged value also yields a nonsignificant 
result.     hIncludes both “asymmetric altruistic” and “extreme altruistic” classifications.     iNo altruist reported a dispute over paternal disinvestment. 
*p≤0.1     **p≤0.05     ***p≤0.01 
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Figure 1. Classification of husbands (H) and wives (W) based on aggregate distribution task 
preferences for each resource type (n=53 husbands and wives from the same marriage). 
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Figure 2. Marital assortment by money distribution preferences among Tsimane (n=53 
couples). 
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Figure 3. Money distribution preferences of Western European and Tsimane spouses (n=209 
total couples). 
 
 
